Using the game-theoretic framework for probability, Vovk and Shafer [10] have shown that it is always possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability forecasts that pass any countable set of well-behaved statistical tests. This result generalizes work by other authors, who consider only tests of calbration.
Introduction
Using the game-theoretic framework for probability [9] , Vovk and Shafer have shown in [10] that it is always possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability forecasts that pass any countable set of well-behaved statistical tests. This result generalizes work by other authors, among them are Foster and Vohra [4] , Kakade and Foster [5] , Lehrer [6] , Sandrony et al. [8] , who consider only tests of calibration.
We complement this result with a lower bound. We show that Vovk and Shafer's result is valid only when the forecasts are computed with unrestrictedly increasing degree of accuracy. When some level of discreteness is fixed, we present a game-theoretic version of Oakes' example for randomized forecasting that is a test failing any given method of deterministic forecasting; originally, this example was presented for deterministic calibration. To formulate this example, we use the forecasting game presented by Vovk and Shafer [10] , namely Binary Forecasting Game II.
We discuss details of the randomized forecasting algorithms in Section 2. The Shafer and Vovk's [9] game-theoretic framework is considered in Section 3. We present in this section the original Vovk and Shafer's [10] result on universal randomized forecasting and prove our result which gives the limits for such forecasting -a gametheoretic version of the Oakes' example for randomized forecasting.
Background
The research discussed in this paper was started from a notion of calibration, originated by Dawid [1, 2] . A test of calibration checks whether the observed empirical frequencies of state occurrences converge to their forecaster probabilities.
Let I(p) denote the indicator function of a subinterval I ⊆ [0, 1], i.e., I(p) = 1 if p ∈ I, and I(p) = 0, otherwise. An infinite sequence of forecasts p 1 , p 2 , . . . is well-calibrated for an infinite sequence of outcomes ω 1 ω 2 . . . if for the characteristic function I(p) of any subinterval of [0, 1] the calibration error tends to zero, i.e.,
as the denominator of the relation (1) tends to infinity. Here, I(p i ) determines some "selection rule" which defines indices i where we compute the deviation between forecasts p i and outcomes ω i . The main problem of sequential forecasting is to define a universal forecasting algorithm which computes forecasts p n given past observations ω 1 , . . . , ω n−1 for each n. This universal prediction algorithm should be well-calibrated for each infinite sequence of outcomes. Oakes [7] proposed arguments (see Dawid [3] for a different proof) that no such algorithm can be well-calibrated for all possible sequences: any forecasting algorithm cannot be calibrated for the sequence ω = ω 1 ω 2 . . ., where Foster and Vohra [4] show that calibration is almost surely guaranteed with a randomizing forecasting rule, i.e., where the forecasts are chosen using internal randomization. Kakade and Foster [5] noticed that some calibration results require very little randomization. They defined "an almost deterministic" randomized rounding universal forecasting algorithm f : for any sequence of outcomes ω 1 ω 2 . . ., an observer can only randomly round the deterministic forecast up to ∆ in order to calibrate with the internal probability 1
where ∆ is the calibration error, I(p) is the indicator function of an arbitrary subinterval of [0, 1] . This approach was further developed by, among others, Lehrer [6] , Sandrony et al. [8] . These papers were only concerned with asymptotic calibration. Non-asymptotic version of randomized forecasting was proposed by Vovk and Shafer [10] and by Vovk et al. [11] . They based on the game-theoretic framework of Shafer and Vovk [9] .
Let P{0, 1} be the set of all measures on the two-element set {0, 1}. Any measure from P{0, 1} is represented by a number p ∈ [0, 1] -the probability of {1}. We consider also the set of all measures on P{0, 1}. Let P[0, 1] be the set of all probability measures on the unit interval [0, 1] supplied with the standard Borel σ-field F .
Randomizing forecasting is defined as follows. For each n, a forecaster given a binary sequence of past outcomes ω 1 . . . ω n−1 (and a sequence of past forecasts p 1 , . . . , p n−1 ) outputs a probability distribution P n ∈ P[0, 1]. The forecasts p n of the the future event ω n = 1 are distributed according to this probability distribution.
Assume for each n, the probability distribution P n is concentrated on a finite subset
is called the level of discreteness of the corresponding forecasting scheme on the sequence
In general case D n is a predictable random variable, i.e., measurable with respect to the σ-field F n−1 , depending on ω 1 . . . ω n−1 . A typical example is the uniform rounding: for each n, rational points p n,i divide the unit interval into equal parts of size 0 < ∆ < 1 and P n is concentrated on these points. In this case the level of discreteness on arbitrary sequence ω 1 ω 2 . . . equals ∆.
Game-theoretic randomized forecasting
Shafer and Vovk [9] proposed a game-theoretic framework for probability theory. In Vovk and Shafer [10] they used this framework to demonstrate the possibility of good probability forecasting in a general setting. This result generalizes the previous work of many authors.
Vovk and Shafer presented a game between Reality, Forecaster and Skeptic. In this game, Forecaster faces Skeptic whose strategy is revealed in advance, and he is allowed to use a degree of randomization to conceal each of his probability forecasts until the corresponding outcome has been announced. Their main result says that Forecaster can keep Skeptic from becoming infinitely reach. Intuitively, this means that the outcomes determined by Reality look random with respect to probability forecasts. This result is a consequence of the von Neumann's minimax theorem.
Vovk and Shafer [10] consider a perfect-information game of randomized forecastingBinary Forecasting Game II between three players -Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality, Random Number Generator described by the following protocol:
Forecaster announces a probability distribution P n ∈ P[0, 1]. Reality announces ω n ∈ {0, 1}. Forecaster announces f n : [0, 1] → R such that f n (p)P n (dp) ≤ 0. Random Number Generator announces p n ∈ [0, 1]. Skeptic updates his capital
Restriction on Skeptic: Skeptic must choose the S n so that his capital K n is nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
Restriction on Forecaster: Forecaster must choose the P n and f n so that his capital F n is nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
Vovk and Shafer [10] showed that Forecaster has a winning strategy in the Forecasting Game II, where Forecaster wins if either (i) his capital F n is unbounded or (ii) Skeptic's capital K n stays bounded; otherwise the other players win. Theorem 1 Forecaster has a winning strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II. Sketch of the proof. For completeness of the presentation, we reproduce the proof from [10] . The proof is based on von Neumann's minimax theorem.
At first, at any round n of Binary Forecasting Game II, a simple auxiliary game between Realty and Forecaster is considered: Forecaster chooses p n ∈ [0, 1], Realty chooses ω n ∈ {0, 1}. Forecaster losses (and Realty gains) S(p n )(ω n − p n ).
For any mixed strategy of Realty Q n ∈ P{0, 1}, let Forecaster's strategy be p n = Q{1}. So, the Realty's expected gain is S(p n )(
In order to apply von Neumann's minimax theorem, which requires that move space be finite, we replace Forecaster move space [0, 1] with a finite subset of [0, 1] dense enough that the value of the game is smaller than some arbitrary small positive number ∆ (depending on n). This is possible, since |S n (p)| ≤ K n−1 ≤ 2 n−1 .
2 The minimax theorem asserts that Forecaster has a mixed strategy P ∈ P[0, 1] such that S n (p)(ω n − p)P (dp) ≤ ∆
for both ω n = 0 and ω n = 1. Let E ∆ be the subset of P[0, 1] consisting all probability measures P satisfying (3) for ω n = 0 and ω n = 1. Endowed with the weak topology, P[0, 1] is compact. Since each E ∆ is closed, ∩E ∆i = ∅, where ∆ i , i = 1, 2, . . ., is some decreasing to 0 sequence of real numbers. So there exists P n ∈ P[0, 1] such that S n (p)(ω n − p)P n (dp) ≤ 0 for both ω n = 0 and ω n = 1.
In Binary Forecasting Game II, consider the strategy for Forecaster that uses at any round n the probability distribution P n just defined and uses as his second move the function f n defined f n (p) = S n (p)(ω n − p). Then F n = K n for all n. So either Skeptic's capital will stay bounded or Forecaster's capital will be unbounded. △ Vovk et al. [11] (see also [10] ) also showed that Skeptic can present a strategy S n (p) such that the winning strategy of Forecaster existing by Theorem 1 announces forecasts p 1 , p 2 , . . . which are well-calibrated for an arbitrary sequence ω 1 ω 2 . . . of outcomes.
In that follows we consider some version of the Oakes' example in the game-theoretic framework. A different version of this result is given in [12] .
We consider some modification of Binary Forecasting Game II in which Skeptic (but not Forecaster) announces f n : [0, 1] → R. This means that Skeptic defines the test of randomness he needs.
Also, at each step n, Skeptic divide his capital into two accounts: K n = Q n + F n ; he uses the capital F n to force Random Number Generator to generate random numbers which pass the test f n .
Forecaster announces a probability distribution P n ∈ P[0, 1]. Reality announces ω n ∈ {0, 1}. Skeptic announces f n : [0, 1] → R such that f n (p)P n (dp) ≤ 0. Random Number Generator announces p n ∈ [0, 1]. Skeptic updates his capital
We divide the Skeptic's capital into two parts: K n = Q n + F n for all n, where Q 0 = 1 and F 0 = 1.
Restriction on Skeptic: Skeptic must choose the S n and f n so that his capital K n is nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
Actually, Skeptic will choose the S n and f n so that both of his capitals Q n and F n are nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
We prove that when Forecaster uses finite subsets of [0, 1] for randomization Realty and Skeptic can defeat Forecaster (and Random Number Generator) in this forecasting game, where Realty and Skeptic win if Skeptic's capital K n is unbounded; otherwise Forecaster and Random Number Generator win. Theorem 2 Assume Forecaster's uses a randomized strategy with a positive level of discreteness on each infinite sequence ω. Then Realty and Skeptic win in the modified Binary Forecasting Game II. Proof. Define a strategy for Realty: at any step n Realty announces an outcome
We follow Shafer and Vovk's [9] method of defining the defensive strategy for Skeptic. Let ǫ k = 2 −k , k = 1, 2, . . .. We define recursively by n: Q
0 (p) = 0, s = 1, 2, and for n ≥ 1
where ξ(true) = 1, ξ(f alse) = 0, and for n ≥ 1
We combine S 1,k
, where
It can be proved by the mathematical induction on n that 0 ≤ Q i,k n ≤ 2 n and |S i,k n (p)| ≤ 2 n−1 for i = 1, 2 and for all k, p and n. Then these sums are finite for each n and p. By (6)- (7) the Skeptic's capital Q n at step n, when he follows the strategy S n (p), equals
Define for each n the function g n (p) = (2ξ(p ≤ 0.5) − 1)(ω n − p). Let E Pn (g n ) = g n (p)P n (dp).
Recall that Forecaster uses some randomized strategy P n , n = 1, 2, . . .. We define recursively by n:
where ǫ k = 2 −k , and for n ≥ 1
By definition for any k and n,
By (10) 0 ≤ F k n ≤ 2 n for all n and k. Finally, Skeptic defines at step n
By definition f n (p)P n (dp) ≤ 0.
By (10) the Skeptic's capital F n at step n, when he follows the strategy f n (p), equals
Also, F n ≥ 0 for all n. Suppose that sup
We have for each k,
Here we use the inequality ln(1 + r) ≥ r − r 2 for all |r| ≤ 1 2 . Since F n is bounded by C > 0, we have for any k
for all sufficiently large n. Define two variables
By definition of g j ,
Assume for any n the probability distribution P n is concentrated on a finite set {p n,1 , . . . , p n,mn }.
For technical reason, if necessary, we add 0 and 1 to the support set of P n and set their probabilities to be 0. Denote p − n = max{p n,t : p n,t ≤ 0.5} and p + n = min{p n,t : p n,t > 0.5}.
By definition ω n , p + n and p − n are predictable and p
Subtracting (12) from (13), we obtain
Using (11), we obtain for all sufficiently large n
Now we compute a lower bound of Skeptic's capital. We have from the definition (4)- (5) and (15)-(16).
(1 + ǫ k ξ(p j ≤ 0.5)(ω j − p j )).
By (15) and (16), for i = 1, 2, 0 ≤ Q i,k n ≤ 2 n for all n no matter how the other players move.
By (15)-(16) at step n ln Q 1,k
ln Q 2,k
The inequalities (17), (18) 
